A Comedy Without Substance by William Shakespeare Essay Example for Free

A Comedy Without Substance by William Shakespeare Essay Old and new comedy both appear during the play, they are only produced for entertainment purposes.Old comedy usually sees a plot with a problem to overcome. This is attempted with a absurd plan, often leading to satire and buffoonery.These key features of old comedy are shown when Hero has to fake her death in order for Claudio to marry her and dogberry and verges court case to gain respect and honour.New Comedy is also visible in the play, it ischaracterised by young man chasing a young woman, the protagonist has to overcome social difficulties in order to succeed in pursuit and eventually ends with restoration. Claudio and Hero are clear examples of old comedy, however Benidick and Beatrice don’t fit into this typical mold but are key romantics. The defective Exchange is a conversation which breeches usual rules of conversation (Grice’s Maxims) which are:1.Be truthful 2. Be concise. 3. be clear. 4. be relevant. In Much Ado About Nothing, this is reflected through those who are out of step or disagree with society.Dogberry and his companions of the middle-class are key characters of this. The use of breeching Grices Maxims in Much ado about nothing cause the play to become a comedy without substance.Dogberry breaks the maxims by not being relevant as he says â€Å"Thou wilt be condemned into everlasting redemption for this†Shakespeares character Dogberry says redemption instead of damnation, this is a malapropism.The fact that he means precisely the opposite of what he so passionately exclaims makes this a comical use of irony.This technique specifically used here potrays this play to be a comedy without substance as this does not at all having any meaning behind it. However Grice Maxims are also broken by Benidick and Beatrice, â€Å"Well, you are a rare parrot-teacher† â€Å"A bird of my tongue is better than a beast of yours† â€Å"I would my horse had the speed of your tongue, and so good a continuer. But keep your way, i Gods name; I have done.† â€Å"You always end with a jades trick: I know you of old†. Shakespeare uses Bendic k and Beatrices merry war for the audience to percieve the characters true feelings for one another, despite the characters not knowing so creating dramatic comedy. They are breaking the Grice Maxim of be truthful. Shakespeare covers these characters true feelings and mixes between good and bad roles of characters. Therefore this shows Much Ado About Nothing is a comedy with substance as Shakespeare explores the geography of human soul. Shakespeare uses comic pairing to create comedy from their dialogue and interaction. Much ado about nothing therefore here is represented as only for entertainment so is a comedy without substance.Dogberry and his companions enter the play at a moment of high drama. â€Å"Come hither, neighbour Seacoal. God hath blessd you with a good name. To be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune, butto write and read comes by nature† â€Å"Both which, Master Constable â€Å"You have. I knew it would be your answer. Well, for yourfavour, sir, why, give God thanks and make no boast of it; andfor your writing and reading, let that appear when there is no need of such vanity† Dogberry messes his words through out all of his lines.He mistakes writing and reading as a sign of vanity which allows the audience to get a glimpse of exactly how Dogberry views the world. To him, being a learned man is a good way to show off how refined you are. He attempts to use a wide range of speech to convince everyone that’s he’s a gentleman, even though he doesn’t really have a grasp of the vocabulary he employs, he is trying to decieve those of upper class. This is purely for laughs and entertainment without any kind of meaning behind it, therefore proving the play is a comedy without substance. However the Beatrice and Benidck are comically paired by Shakespeare to create comedy, however this shows Much Ado About Nothing is a comedy with substance as there is a key message behind this pairing.â€Å"Why, then your uncle, and the Prince, and Claudio Have been deceived; for they swore you did† â€Å"Do not you love me?† â€Å"Troth, no; no more than reason. â€Å"Why, then my cousin, Margaret, and Ursula.Are much deceivd; for they did swear you did†Ã¢â‚¬Å"They swore that you were well-nigh dead for me† Shakespeare potrays Benedick and Beatrice as having a view that everyone around them i s deceived about their love for each other, but they’re only fooling themselves.Here Shakespeare expresses that despite Bendick and Beatrices clear intelligence and wit, they themselves are unable to show their true feelings. This shows the play is a comedy with substance. Their clever wit is used to decive eachother, however this produces dramatic irony as the audience know this is not the case.â€Å"I would my horse had the speed of your tongue, and so good acontinuer. But keep your way, a Gods name! I have done† â€Å"You always end with a jades trick. I know you of old†.Shakespeare uses the two characters language as weapons, but they never seem to be able to end or resolve their fights. Benedick backs out first, this creates a comedy with substance as women in the Victorian times were supposed to be seen and not heard. Shakespeare uses characters so the audience to laughing with and laughing at them.The audience laughs openly at Dogberry and the townsmen whereas they do not laugh outright at the people of the court, except in the case of Beatrice and Benedick and the way they are deceived and deceive themselves which suggests more respect is given for the higher class. This shows it is a comedy with substance as it is shown here the difference in which classes are taken as.Dogberry, a watchman is comical relief for the comedy itself. He is memorable in that he constantly uses malapropisms, or incorrect uses of words, in his dialogue. Goodman Verges, sir, speaks a little off the matter-an old man, sir, and his wits are not so blunt. Shakespeare uses malapropism here, instead of sharp he says blunt, this creates dramatic comedy as we are laughing at Dogberrys dialogue mistakes. This is only seen in the lower class characters. Despite Dogberry sussing out Don John he is still considered to be the almost clown of the play.Another low class character is Margret,, in contrast with Dogberry she is not trying to gain higher respect, she has no respect for herself..â€Å"Of what, lady? of speaking honorably?† Whilst talking to Hero while she is having doubts she mentions the word honourable this creates dramatic irony since the plot is about to turn into a question of honourbaility due to Margrets actions.This part of the play is purely for entertainment for the build up to the plot so therefore Much Ado about nothing is a comedy without substance. Shakespeare uses the upper class to allow the audience to laugh with them. These characters are better educated and have more wit. Beatrice is one of these characters â€Å"I had rather hear my dog bark0` at a crow, than a man swear he loves me.† This creates dramatic comedy as men usually have that attitude towards love and women. Shakespeare uses Beatrice to portray a dominant,powerful woman who can fight her own battles compared to the steretypical woman role.This is purely just for entertainment to create comedy.However Bendick despite his higher education reads into things too much and is tricked into thinking Beatrice likes him which causes collusion â€Å"Ha! Against my will I am sent to bid you come in to dinner.Theres a double meaning in that. I took no more pains for thosethanks than you took pains to thank me. Thats as much as to say, Any pains that I take for you is as easy as thanks. If I do not take pity of her, I am a villain; if I do not love her, I am a Jew. I will go get her picture† Benedick convinces himself that there†™s underlying romantic meaning in Beatrice’s words, even when that’s obviously not the case. Love has the power to make us see what we want in conversation. Exclusion is taking place here as Shakespeare shows even higher classes are fooled and mistaken therefore,substance is clear as it shows there is not much difference between the two classes. Shakespeare uses trickery to make Much Ado about Nothing a comedy. Comedy has a substance here as it shows it does not expose evil just a lack of awareness.Hero tricked by Don Pedro as he is wooing Hero for Claudio.Tis once, thou lovest,And I will fit thee with the remedy.I know we shall have revelling to-night.I will assume thy part in some disguise and tell fair Hero I am Claudio,And in her bosom Ill unclasp my heartAnd take her hearing prisoner with the forceAnd strong encounter of my amorous tale†.Don Pedro here manipulates gullible and innocent Hero into falling in love with Claudio. It’s shady that Don Pedro will get Hero to fall in love with his words, thinking they’re Claudio’s words. Claudio and Don Pedro don’t care if they manipulate Hero under falseness,as they’ve only got their eyes on the prize of winning her even if she is deceived into being won by a guy she doesn’t know and has never spoken to. Trickery creates substance as it potrays Shakspeares as evil being seen as a lack of awareness. Beatrice and Bendick are also tricked into loving eachother.Shakespeare creates this for the audience to laugh at their naivety and foolishness despite their typical wit.Much Ado About Nothing is a comedy with substance as the message behind this specific plot is anyone can be decieved and fooled since the wittiest and intelligent of characters get fooled. Don Pedro expresses this.â€Å"Benedick that, in despite of his quick wit and his queasy stomach, he shall fall in love with Beatrice. If we can do this,Cupid is no longer an archer; his glory shall be ours, for we are†Don Pedro and Claudio create deception, but rather than tricking him into loving Beatrice, they are manipulating Benedick into making his own decision. Don Pedro also refers to them as being cupid despite lies and deciet taking place. This play is a comedy with substance as Shakespeare shows even the higher archery of society lie and deciet. Shakespeare critises marriage during the play through using the characters, yet the plot finishes its destination at the moment of resoultion where all is solved by marriage. This shows Much Ado about nothing is a play made purely for entertainment purposes with no substance.

The Physics Behind Remote Sensing :: Physics

Remote Sensing is the science of acquiring, processing and interpreting images that record the interaction between the electromagnetic energy and matter (Sabins, 1997). Remote sensing offers extensive applications in almost every area of science from monitoring forest fires to geologic mapping . Although many aspects of remote sensing are complex and difficult to understand the basic theory behind remote sensing is simple physics. There are four major stages of remote sensing. The first stage is the source of energy, usually the sun, which sends energy to a target. The second stage is the interactions that the energy will go through as it passes through a vacuum and the earth’s atmosphere. There is then interactions that occurs with the body on earth’s surface. The energy again, goes through the atmosphere and finally the sensor is able to detect and record the electromagnetic energy. Electromagnetic Energy Electromagnetic energy is a dynamic form of energy that is caused by the acceleration or oscillation of a charged particle. All substances above absolute zero (0 Kelvin) emit a range of electromagnetic energy. The sun emits electromagnetic energy and practically all of the natural electromagnetic energy injected into the earth is produced by the sun (Prakush, 2002). Electromagnetic Radiation Electromagnetic Radiation is the streams of mass-less particles, traveling in a harmonic, sinusoidal fusion at the velocity of light each possessing a specific amount of energy. The distance from one peak to the next is the wavelength and the number of peaks passing through a fixed point per unit time is the wave frequency (Lillesand and Kiefer, 1994). Electromagnetic radiation is Electromagnetic energy in motion and can be described by the basic wave theory. Electromagnetic Spectrum Electromagnetic waves are characterized by their wavelength location within the electromagnetic spectrum which is most commonly measured in micrometers. Names are often assigned to regions of the electromagnetic spectrum, but there is no clear cut dividing lines from one region to the next (Lillesand and Kiefer, 1994). Stefan - Boltzmann Law How much energy any objects radiates is a function of its surface temperature. The Stefan - Boltzmann equations tells one that as a temperature of a body increase the total radiance of the body will also increase. (Sabins, 1997). Interactions The way electromagnetic radation interacts with matter can be detected with different sensors. How the radation interacts depends upon the properties of the medium, the wavelength of the incedent radation and the incident angle. There are four major types of interactions that occur: transmission, reflection, scattering and absorption (Lillesand and Kiefer, 1994).

Enron, the smartest guys in the room Essay

Enron was one of the biggest scandal of all time in the stock market. The three main guys leading the pack was Ken Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and Andy Fastow. The company was not making profit so they decided to do â€Å"future value accounting†. This was shown to shareholders so they can spend money and invest in Enron. The future value accounting just shows a list of future profit that was predicted. What actually happened? Why it can happen again? What can be done to prevent it? and What is now being don’t to prevent it? These are the question that will be answered and explained. What actually happened? Andy Fastow was the one who created several smaller companies that would hide the losses Enron had made. Enron showed that they were making great increases in the stock market and others wanted a piece of that. They even convinced their own employees to buy stocks. Enron wanted to hide their scandal so bad that they paid investment company to fire the employee that had any concerns. Enron was behind the California Energy Crisis and made billions off the state. They had the power plants shut down and resold energy for much higher and made outrageous profit. Their company got so big within a short amount of time, but so did their losses. It was getting much harder for them to hide the scandal as their company progresses. A writer at Forbes magazine was the one who started the collapse of Enron. She released an article and what Enron was truly doing and it went downhill from there. Jeffrey Skilling bailed on the company and sold all his stocks and left Ken Lay and Andy Fastow to run the company. Enron eventually collapsed and all the employee lost everything. Jeffrey Skilling and Andy Fastow were sent to prison for the scandal and Ken Lay passed away after the trials. The main thing that can be done to prevent another Enron scandal is the involvement of the investors themselves. The stockholders need to know about everything and anything that goes on in the company they are investing to the best of their abilities. Management and the Board members also play a very big role in avoiding another Enron. They are the one to keep track of the funds coming in and out of the company. Calpers are the current members that watch over the investors money and make sure everything is where they’re suppose to be. Regulators are also important in having strict regulations for companies, but lenient enough so there is room for competition. The Enron Scandal can happen again if a company is using the â€Å"future value of accounting†, but with the new check and order that is set up, it is very unlikely it will happen. These new check and order are very strict and precise on company so that they can prevent another major scandal. Audit committee’s have the right to access the company’s financial statements and have the company cooperate with them at all times. The reason why Enron got away with their scandal for so long was because they had their own audit committee â€Å"checking up† on them. There is no way to completely prevent another scandal, but a scandal as big as Enron will surely not happen again. In the end, check and balance comes in to play to keep any company from pulling a scandal as big as Enron. Because there was a loose leash over the company, Enron took advantage of that to the max and scammed every investor for their money. Now the lesson has been learned and companies are being regulated and watched for the best of the investors.

Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, Abd Debt In OECD Countries - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 7 Words: 1992 Downloads: 4 Date added: 2019/08/12 Category Politics Essay Level High school Tags: Political Parties Essay Did you like this example? Abstract Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a career-concerns model with political parties. This allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation (at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits), that right-wing governments (at least for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left- wing governments, and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19-country OECD data. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transpar ency is associated with lower public debt and deficits, independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, Abd Debt In OECD Countries" essay for you Create order 1 We thank David Skilling for participating in the early stages of this project and Alberto Alesina, Morten Bennedsen, Tim Besley, Carles Boix, Bob Inman, Casey Mulligan, Jonathan Rodden, Christian Schultz, Ken Shepsle, David Stromberg, Guido Tabellini, and participants in the Fiscal Federalism Conference at CES, Harvard, the Political Economy Workshop at Harvard, the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (San Francisco), ECPR (Canterbury), and the Danish Public Choice Workshop III for very useful comments and suggestions. This work was begun when Lassen was visiting Harvard. He would like to thank the Economic Policy Research Unit, the Danish Research Academy and a Sasakawa International Fellowship for funding, and Harvard for its hospitality. The work was completed under an EPRU-network grant. * [emailprotected] ** [emailprotected] Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal Policy Outcomes 1. Introduction Many believe that fiscal transparency has large and positive effects on fiscal performance. According to the IMF, â€Å"transparency in government operations is widely regarded as an important precondition for macroeconomic fiscal sustainability, good governance, and overall fiscal rectitude† (Kopits and Craig 1998: 1). Both the IMF and the OECD have recently developed Codes of Best Practice for Fiscal Transparency. Fiscal adjustment programs (like some aimed at satisfying Maastricht Treaty criteria) can employ or produce creative accounting practices. Transparency can affect the probability that such budgetary tricks are revealed. In ways like that, more transparency leads to lower budget deficits and makes fiscal discipline and control of spending easier to achieve. However, while such asserted effects are common, there is not much empirical evidence about institutional transparency and fiscal policy outcomes. Some links appear between fiscal transparency and fiscal performa nce in European countries, and between indirect measures of transparency and fiscal performance in Latin American countries.Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal Policy Outcomes 1. Introduction Many believe that fiscal transparency has large and positive effects on fiscal performance. According to the IMF, â€Å"transparency in government operations is widely regarded as an important precondition for macroeconomic fiscal sustainability, good governance, and overall fiscal rectitude† (Kopits and Craig 1998: 1). Both the IMF and the OECD have recently developed Codes of Best Practice for Fiscal Transparency. Fiscal adjustment programs (like some aimed at satisfying Maastricht Treaty criteria) can employ or produce creative accounting practices. Transparency can affect the probability that such budgetary tricks are revealed. In ways like that, more transparency leads to lower budget deficits and makes fiscal discipline and control of spending easier to achieve. However, while such asse rted effects are common, there is not much empirical evidence about institutional transparency and fiscal policy outcomes. Some links appear between fiscal transparency and fiscal performance in European countries, and between indirect measures of transparency and fiscal performance in Latin American countries. Many remain convinced of the importance of fiscal transparency, however.2 The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a higher degree of fiscal transparency is in fact associated with lower public debt, other things equal. To do this, we extend the career- concerns model of public debt developed by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and, in particular, Shi and Svensson (2002) to include political parties with preferences over public spending. We show that this allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation, at least partly through an effect on the electoral cycle (Shi and Svensson, 2002), that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation (see, for instance, Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), and that right-wing governments, at least for strategic reasons, tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments (Persson and Svensson, 1989). We also develop measures of fiscal transparency and show that recent evidence from OECD countries is consistent with these implications, even after controlling for the effects of explanatory variables from other political- economic models of debt and deficits, and accounting for the potential endogeneity of transparency. 2 On Europe, see von Hagen (1992), de Haan et al. (1999), Milesi-Ferretti (forthcoming), and Hallerberg et al. (2001). On Latin America, see Alesina et al. (1999). The theoretical literature on the causes and consequences of fiscal, or budgetary, transparency is not large.3 In the Shi and Svensson (2002) political agency model that we extend below, voters want more competent politicians in office, as they can provide more public goods for given levels of taxation and private consumption. However, this creates incentives for incumbents to try to â€Å"appear competent† by issuing debt, providing more public goods by ‘buying now and paying later’. In the model, the degree of fiscal or budget transparency determines when and how far voters can observe debt, and thus the extent to which an incumbent can use debt to appear competent. Milesi-Ferretti (forthcoming), on the other hand, considers in a reduced-form model the effect of transparency on government debt and deficits in a regime characterized by fiscal rules, allowing for creative accounting practices like those arising in connection with the Maastricht Treaty (Easterly 19 99). Transparency, Milesi-Ferretti argues, affects the probability that such practices are revealed, resulting in a penalty for not meeting the formal budget rule requirement. Thus, transparency determines the scope for creative accounting vs. â€Å"true† fiscal adjustment, and matters only because of the existence of fiscal rules. Finally, Ferejohn (1999) examines an agency model in which fiscal transparency affects voter trust in government and thus the size of government. In all these cases, transparency increases the probability or accuracy of observations of incumbents’ performance. The empirical literature on transparency is also limited, in part by measurement problems.4 So, in addition to providing a model that synthesizes and unifies several disparate results on debt, we construct a direct, replicable index variable measuring the transparency of budget processes of OECD countries. The index contains variables comparable though not identical to ones collected and ana lyzed in the American states (Alt, Lassen, and Skilling 2002). Further, we use this index to investigate empirically the hypotheses of the model. We find that fiscal transparency is, indeed, robustly associated with lower public debt and deficits, even after allowing for the effects of partisanship and polarization. However, we also recognize that fiscal institutions are subject to change, and investigate the reasons why governments change fiscal 3 Asymmetric information models of fiscal policy have been studied by, e.g., Rogoff (1990), but a direct focus on the role of fiscal transparency is rare. Besley and Prat (2001) touch on transparency in their investigation of the role of the media in communicating information about the government to voters. The effects of transparency about monetary policy objectives has begun to be studied as well; see, e.g., Faust and Svensson (2001), Jensen (2002), and Stasavage (2003). 4 Alesina and Perotti (1996) note that the â€Å"results on transparency probably say more about the difficulty of measuring it, than about its effect on fiscal discipline†, a point echoed in Alesina and Perotti (1999) and Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000). 2 Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal Policy Outcomes transparency. This allows us to correct transparency for possible endogeneity in the empirical analysis. Estimating the simultaneous empirical model leaves the main results unaltered. Finally, many other analyses of public debt focus on the number of actors involved in the budget process. Two conjectures predominate: either there is a â€Å"common pool problem† so that actors do not internalize the full cost of their spending or there is a â€Å"fragmentation problem† so that they cannot coordinate, for instance on a response to negative shocks. â€Å"Actors† include the number of spending ministers, parties in a governing coalition, decentralized units in a fe deral system, or veto players.5 Our model does not make specific predictions about these other variables, so in the empirical analysis we control for as many alternative approaches as possible. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines fiscal transparency. Section 3 summarizes the career-concerns model of fiscal transparency with competing political parties, deriving results for the effects of transparency, and partisanship and polarization from the â€Å"strategic debt† literature, to guide the empirical analysis. (We present the full model in an appendix.) Section 4 describes the construction of the transparency index, as well as other data, used in the empirical work. Section 5 examines the effects of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance, the causes of variation in fiscal transparency across the OECD, and the possible endogeneity of transparent institutions with respect to debt. Section 6 concludes. 2. Defining Fiscal Transparency Greater transparency eases the task of attributing outcomes to the acts of particular politicians. It makes observers more able to distinguish effort from opportunistic behavior or stochastic factors â€Å"primarily by providing actors with greater or lesser degrees of certainty about the present and future behavior of other actors† (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 939).6 With respect to the budgetary process, a comprehensive definition of fiscal transparency is the following: â€Å"Fiscal transparency is defined †¦ as openness toward the public at large about government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and 5 Proposed remedies include delegation to a strong central Ministry of Finance (when there is no problem of ideological heterogeneity) and a form of commitment among coalition partners when there is (Hallerberg et al. 2001). On the effects of number, possibly conditional on decentralization and heterogeneity, of ministers and parties see Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) and Volkerink and de Haan (2001); on decentralized units in a federal system see Rodden and Wibbels (2002); and on veto players see Tsebelis (2002). Outcomes projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on government activities †¦ so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s financial position and the true costs and benefits of government activities, including their present and future economic and social implications† (Kopits and Craig 1998: 1).7 The literature also provides specific examples of transparent budget reporting procedures: â€Å"A transparent budget process is one that provides clear information on all aspects of government fiscal policy. Budgets that include numerous special accounts and that fail to consolidate all fiscal activity into a single ‘bottom line’ measure are not transparent. Budgets that are easily available to the public and to participants in the policymaking process, and that do present consolidated information, are transparent† (Poterba and von Hagen 1999: 3-4). As features of non-transparent financial reporting, Alesina and Perotti (1996) identify optimistic predictions on key economic variables and forecasts of the effects of new policies, and creative and strategic use of what is kept on or off budget, budget projections, and multi-year budgeting. We believe more transparent procedures have four distinct characteristics. First, more transparent procedures should process more information, and, other things equal, do so in fewer documents. This speaks to openness and ease of access and monitoring. Second, the possibility of independent verification, which has been shown experimentally to be a key feature in making communication persuasive and/or credible, increases transparency. Third, there should be a commitment to non-arbitrary language: words and classifications should have clear, shared, unequivocal meanings. The use of generally accepted accounting principles in some of the American states is a good example of this. Finally, the presence of more justification increases transparency, reducing the optimism and strategic creativity referred to above. Below we operationalize multiple indicators of these characteristics into an index of budget transparency.